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fundamental questions about the meaning of borders, territorial sovereignty and political space and explores
the implications for territorial jurisdiction and global governance at some length.
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4.3 
"As Twas walkin'- T saw a sign there 
And that s ign said 'private property' 
But on the other s ide, it didn't say nothing' 
N ow that side was made tor you and me." 
vVoody Guthrie 
"The spatial scope of social and political organization is not 
set tor all time. The territorial state is not a sacred unit beyond 
historical time." (Agnew 1994, p.l 05) 
The dispute arising from the European Union's attempts to protect information 
privacy, an individual's control over the processing of personally identifiable or name-
linked data (Kang 1998), raises difficult questions about territorial jurisdiction and 
democratic governance, indeed about how political "space" and a political community are 
defined in the digital age. It illustrates an emerging geographic incongruity between the 
reach and domain ofthe territorial! y defined Westphal ian state -- as legal j urisdiction, 
political authority, and self-governing democratic community -- and the deep and dense 
network oftransnational economic relations that constitute the early 21 st century world 
economy. 
Neither cross-border transactions nor jurisdictional conflict are nevi : both are 
inherent in an international system rooted in geography, in the "institutionalization of 
public authority within mutually exclusive territorial domains" (Ruggie 1993, p. 275). 
System norms, however, assume that jurisdictional conflict and extraterritorial reach are 
the exception rather than the rule. That states accept geographic limits to claims to their 
authority to allow both their coexistence in defined territorial spaces and extensive cross-
border interactions (Spruyt 1994, p. 169.). It is reasonable to ask whether the exception 
could become the rule. Whether territorial sovereignty, as mutually exclusive geographic 
jurisdiction based upon discrete and effective borders, will remain a meaningful construct 
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in the face ofthe increasing intensity, depth, and geographic ambiguity oftransnational 
economic transactions. 
Regulatory Spill-over and the Digital age 
Given the Westphalian system's norm of mutually exclusive jurisdiction one 
would expect differences in law and regulation to be the rule: they are definitional at the 
most basic level. Compare Germany's strict control of retail store opening hours and 
limits on promotional or discount activity with the absence of vittually any limits on 
either in the United States, for example. 
Regulatory differences become problematic and conflictual when there is cross-
border "spill over" into other jurisdictions . That occurs when I) the impact ofthe 
regulation is not limited to the geographic territory ofthe originating jurisdiction and 2) 
state capabilities and authority in other affected j urisdictions are constrained to the point 
where impacts cannot be mitigated. 
Regulatory spill-over is becoming more common in the trans-Atlantic context. 
EU competition authorities' objections derailed the merger of Honeywell and General 
Electric, two "American" companies, and the head ofthe U.S. Anti-Trust Division felt it 
necessary to remind European authorities that their concerns about Microsoft's use of 
market power had not held up in American coutts. Given the size ofthe EU's economy 
and its relative preference for regu lation, its policies have had a significant impact within 
the United States: as a Wall Street .Journal atticle noted, "Americans may not realize it, 
but rules governing the food they eat, the software they use and the cars they drive, are 
increasingly set in Brussels ... '·' (Mitchener 2002, p. I). 
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Electronic integration increases dramatically the potential for regulatory spill-
over. While electronic networks may not be borderless, cross-border transactions are 
effortless; in an electronically interconnected world the effects of any given action-
posting an article on a website, for example-- can be felt elsewhere (and everywhere) 
with no relationship to geography and territorial jurisdiction whatsoever (Berman 2002). 
While the objective ofthe European Union's ( 1995) Data Directive is "domestic,'' 
given the inevitability of cross-border data flows it attempts to protect the data privacy of 
Europeans regardless of \vhere data are transferred and processed. In this case spill-over 
is inherent ifthe Directive's protection is to be effective; the "domestic" legislation has a 
transnational footprint 
Article 25 (of which much more below) prohibits the transfer of personally 
identifiable data to any third country that does not provide "adequate" protection, which 
includes the United States. As cutting-off trans-Atlantic data flows would have had 
catastrophic impacts, bilateral negotiations were undertaken resulting in the "Safe 
Harbor" agreement which attempts to provide protection for personal information 
deemed adequate by the Europeans without unduly compromising American beliefs in 
self-regulation and the marketplace. As will be seen, however, Safe Harbor does not 
appear to be a success and both Europeans and Americans find themselves subject to data 
protection regimes that are not oftheir making and to which they resist complying. 
I wi II proceed by first discussing the general issue of data or information privacy 
(the terms are used interchangeably here) and its protection and then turn to a detailed 
examination of differences in American and European data protection norms and revie\V 
implementation. I will then review the progress of Safe Harbor to date and conclude b y 
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discussing the implications of the data privacy dispute for territorial jurisdiction and 
global governance at some length. 
Data Privacy 
Data privacy involves the terms under which information identifiable to an 
individual is acquired, disclosed and used (Privacy Working Group 1995). 1 Concern 
about information privacy is not new; the New York Police Department "tapped'' their 
first telephone call in 1895 (No am 1997) and party I ine telephones were notorious in rural 
areas. 
That being said, the information revolution and the ubiquity of Cyberspace have 
significantly increased the threats to data privacy. Using the Information Infrastructure to 
communicate, order goods and services, or obtain information produces electronic data 
that can easily and inexpensively be stored, retrieved, analyzed, and reused (Privacy 
Working Group 1995). Rapidly developing technologies (data mining) are providing 
new and very powerful means to sort, combine and analyze data. Last and critically, 
these data exist in a netl-vorked emJironment: personal information collected and 
processed on any computer on the Net is, at least in theory, accessible by every computer 
on the Net (Reidenberg 2000). 
Lessig argues that given the architecture of cyberspace, data collection could well 
become the norm, "(T)he world there can be made s uch that in the ordinary case, 
information is collected ceaselessly - invisibly, behind the scenes, with no burden on the 
user" ( 1999, p. 62). In fact, the gathering of personal information and profiling are part 
1 
" Identifiable to an individual" has been defined in terms of an authorship relation, descriptive relation, or 
an instrumental relation (Kang 1998). l11c EU Data Directive defines an identifiable person is one who can 
be identified directly or indirectly, by reference either to an identification number or "one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological , mental, economic, cultural or social identity" (Article 2a, The 
Counc il 1995) 
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and parcel of electronic commerce: a January 2000 U.S. federal Trade Commission 
survey reveals that between 97 and 99% of all \vebsites collect personal identifying 
information from and about consumers.2 
Protecting Personal Information 
The protection of personal information entails complex benefit/cost trade-offs for 
both society and indi viduals. The Economist (1 999) argues that "the end of privacy'' will 
result from the cumulative effect of a series of bargains where each benefit offered by the 
information economy, such as cheaper communications, more entertainment, better 
government services or a wider selection of products, seems worth the surrender of a bit 
more personal information. 
As fromholz (2000) notes, privacy is not an absolute good: it results in 
unquestioned benefits, but a lso " imposes real costs on society." While privacy may 
protect some individuals, it may result in economic and social costs by preventing others 
from making fully informed decisions. f rumholz cites instances such as a babysitter who 
was convicted of child abuse or a physician with a history of malpractice. 
The issue is more subtle, and more general, than hiding a disreputable past. In an 
information-based economy, protection of name-linked data involves weighing individual 
rights to privacy on the one hand and economic efficiency on the other; the right of a 
business to record transaction generated information and consumers' demands that they 
be informed about the gathering and use of this data are often in tens ion (Milberg, Smith, 
and Burke 2000). The constant struggle between the information needs of a credit driven 
economy and protection of individ ual privacy provide an example. 
" 
-The FTC concludes that "Most of the sites surveyed, therefore, arc capable of creating personal profiles 
of online consumers by tying any demographic, interest, purchasing behavior, or surfing behavior 
information they collect to personal identifying information" (Bureau of Consumer Protection 2000, p. I 0). 
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How this benefit/cost trade-off is evaluated is a function of culture, social norms, 
political and economic philosophy and h istorical experience. The very idea of what 
information privacy represents, its relative impottance versus other social "goods" such 
as free speech, who is responsible for protecting it, and how it should be protected vary 
dramatically across countries and cultures, even those as close as Europe and America. 
Data privacy is never considered in a vacuum, but rather in a specific soci al, 
political, economic, cultural and historical context. In the modern political system, that 
context is the territorial state, the "physical container of society" (Agnew 1994). There is 
considerable cross-border variation in data privacy norms, whether information privacy is 
a considered a bas ic human right or a propetty right for example. These norms, in turn, 
affect what fair information principles actually mean in practice. 3 Last, given differences 
in context and norms there is considerable variance in implementation and execution. 
now turn to a comparison ofthe context of protection and privacy in the U.S. and CU. 
Context and norms 
fundamental differences in the American and European contexts have led to very 
different data privacy norms. Two distinct v isions of democratic governance - views 
about the responsibility ofthe state to protect the rights of its c it izens and the 
effectiveness and equity of markets (Reidenberg 2000) - are reflected in deep-seated 
differences in normative and positive beliefs about markets versus regulatory solutions to 
social problems, faith in technology, the relative weight put on individual rights and 
3 A num ber of autl10rs argue that there may be a tendency towards convergence around a set of generally 
accepted " fair information principles" including s tandards relating to data qual ity, transparency in 
processing, treatment of sensitive data, and enforcement mechanisms (Bennett 1997; Reid en berg 2000). 
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economic efficiency, and individual versus collective societal responsibility for one's 
welfare. 
In the United States, rights are generally, if not universally, seen as rights against 
the government.4 Thus, the U.S. approach to data privacy reflects a basic distrust of 
government; markets and self-regulation rather than la\v shape information privacy in the 
U.S. and as a result the legislation that does exist is reactive and issue specific (George, 
Lynch, and Marsnik 200 I; Reidenberg 2000). Protection tends to be tmt based and 
market oriented rather than political: a "patchwork of rules" that deal \Vith specific 
sectors and problems in a haphazard manner (Banisar and Davies 1999; frumholz 2000; 
Kang 1998; Reidenberg 2000; Roch 1996; Swire and Litan 1998). 
In America privacy is seen as an alienable commodity subject to the market. 
Disputes about personal information as well as mechanisms for its protection are cast in 
economic terms : questions about propetty rights; who "owns" the data collected in a 
commercial transaction; and who has the right to the rents flowing from its exploitation.5 
The American emphasis on the market is evident even in the context of regulation. 
Senator Holl ings cast the need for The Online Personal Privacy Act (S.220 I) in terms of 
strong preemption (to give business the certainty it needs in the face of conflicting state 
standards}, promoting consumer confidence and bolstering online commerce, and 
preventing consumer fears from stifling the Internet as a consumer medium (U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce 2002). 
In contrast, the European approach to data privacy puts the burden of protection 
reflects on society rather than the individual. Privacy is considered to be inalienable, a 
4 This tends not to be the case in Europe. T owe this point to David Post. 
5 Sec (Hahn and Layne-Farrar 2001; Lessig 1999; Litman 2000; Rule and Hunter 1999; Sholtz 2001) tor 
exam pi cs. 
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fundamental human right, and comprehensive systems of protection take the form of 
explicit statutes accompanied b y regulatory agencies to oversee enforcement. It is the 
protection ofthe rights of citizens or "data subjects" rather than consumers or users that 
is of concern (frumholz 2000; George, Lynch, and Marsnik 200 I; Reidenberg 2000).6 
The introduction to the EU Data Directive states, " (W)hereas data-processing 
systems are designed to serve man ... they must...respect the fundamental freedoms and 
rights of individuals, notable the right to privacy, and contribute to economic and social 
progress ... " Article I. I of the Directive is clear: "Member states shall protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to 
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data" (The Council 1995, pp 2 and 
I 0). It is not accidental that privacy as a right precedes its contribution to economic and 
social progress in the text. 
In summary, trans-Atlantic differences w·ith regards to data privacy and its 
protection reflect deeply rooted differences in historical experience, cultural values, and 
beliefs about the organization ofthe polity, economy and society. Ambassador Aaron, 
who negotiated Safe Harbor, notes that in Europe "privacy protection is an obligation of 
the state towards its citizens. In America we believe that privacy is a right that inheres in 
the individual. We can trade our private information for some benefit. In many instances 
Europeans cannot' ' (200 I ). 
6 European concern about data privacy may be, to some extent, historically driven. TI1c TI1ird Reich's usc 
of private data (and the thought of what that regime might have accomplished with access to modern data 
bases) and more recent experience with repressive regimes to the East have made Europeans all too aware 
of the consequences of the accumulation and transfer of personal information for an individual's safety, 
integrity and privacy. As detailed in (Black 2001 ), the Third Reich made full usc of punch card sorting 
machines, primitive technology by today's standards. 
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One caveat is important; it is difficult to generalize about European and American 
data privacy norms. Data privacy in Europe may \Vel! be an elite concern and it is not 
clear how widespread concern is among the mass of Europeans at large. furthermore, 
much ofthe privacy rhetoric in the United Sates flows from interest groups: business 
lobbies on the one hand and privacy advocates on the other. Survey data indicates that 
the American public is concerned about personal privacy and is, to some degree, 
ambivalent about the capacity ofthe market or self-regulatory solutions to solve the 
problem. 
The Implementation of Privacy Protection 
The United States 
The word " privacy" is never mentioned in the Constitution, neither that document 
nor the Bill of Rights deal with the issue explicitly (Gellman 1997; George, Lynch, and 
Marsnik 200 I; Reidenberg 1995; Roch 1996). As late as 1890 \vhen Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis published their famous Harvard Law Review atticle defining privacy as 
"the right to be left alone," a coherent notion of privacy did not exist in American law 
7 (Gormley 1992, p. 1343, 1344 ). 
The extension ofthe fourth Amendment's guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures to deal with privacy issues took the better part of another century. 
Even then, the Supreme Court was clear that the foutth Amendment protection only 
applies to "certain kinds of governmental intrusion" and not to the private sector; it 
protects citizens against the government rather than one another (Gellman 1997; Gormley 
1992; Reidenberg 1995 ). 
7 Tt is of interest that Ken Gromlcy ascribes Warren and Brandeis' motivation to the rise of"ycllow 
journalism" in the Boston tabloids which was, itsctt: a function of technological changes which allowed the 
production of cheap mass circulation newspapers. Also sec (Rcidcnbcrg 1995). 
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The development of protection has been sporadic, inchoate, sectorially specific 
and reactive. The fair Credit Repot1ing Act of 1970 was the first U.S. attempt at 
protecting information privacy in the private sector (Caudill and Murphy 2000). 
Subsequent legislation has dealt with s pecific problems as deemed necessary; the "Bork 
Bill" ( 1988) protects data on video tape rentals; the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection Act ( 1992) regulates the disclosure of name-linked data for cable subscribers; 
and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act limits the personal information that can 
be collected from children ( frumholz 2000). 
After reviewing results of its 2000 survey ofthe privacy practices of Websites the 
federal Trade Commission reversed its previous opinion and argued that self-regulation 
alone was not sufficient and recommended that Congress enact legislation to ensure 
adequate protection of consumer privacy online (Bureau of Consumer Protection 2000, p. 
ii ). Even though there are a number of bills being considered by Congress , regulatory 
protection of data privacy in the United States is still quite limited. 
The European Union 
The history of European data protection is grounded in the attempts of European 
countries, particularly the federal Republic of Germany, to "curb the threat of the 
improper use of personal data'' (Roch 1996, p.72). The right to privacy is specifically 
mentioned in a number of constitutions (e.g., Germany and Spain) and in the Council of 
Europe's "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms" 
(George, Lynch, and Marsnik 200 I ).8 
8 Article 8 of the Convention is en titled "Right to respect for private and family life" and it states that 
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence" 
(emphasis added). (Council of the Europe 1950) 
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Sweden established the first data protection law in 1973 (fhe Swedish Data Bank 
Statue), followed by Germany in 1977 (based on a law passed by the state of Hesse in 
1973) (Roch 1996). With the increasing integration of Europe regional efforts followed. 
In 1980, the OECD issued voluntary Guidelines on the Protection ofPrivacy and 
Transhorder Flows of Personal Data (which was signed by the United Sates) and a year 
later the Council of Europe issued a convention For the Protection oflndividual with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Swire and Litan 1998). 
The Council of Europe's 1981 Convention was based on the OECD guidelines 
and called for national implementation of data privacy laws by individual European 
states. It is important to note that both the OECD guidelines and the Council's 
Convention call for explicit privacy legislation and support curbs oftransborder data 
flows if protection in the recipient country is not sufficient (George, Lynch, and Marsnik 
200 I; Roch 1996). 
By the early 1990s many of the EU member states had enacted data privacy laws 
based on the Council's Convention and as barriers to full economic and financial 
integration fell, differences in national data protection legislation became a concern. The 
Data Directive was proposed as a means to harmonize data protection laws; Directive 
95/46/EC ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council "on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data" was 
enacted in 1995 and came into force in 1998. The Directive does not apply directly, but 
requires each member state to enact legislation which meets minimum standards for the 
protection of personal information. (George, Lynch, and Marsnik 200 I; Reidenberg 
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200 I b; Roch 1996; Swire and Litan 1998). The primary provisions ofthe Directive 
require that: 
• Data collected must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for \vhich they are collected and processed. 
• Data may not be further processed in ways incompatible w ith the purposes for 
which they are collected. 
• Recipients of information are entitled to know where the information comes from, 
how it was collected, whether responses were voluntary, and the like. 
• Individuals have full access to all data linked to their name and the right to correct 
any inaccurate data. Individuals also have the right to "opt out" of futther 
process ing or transmission of personal data. 
• Processing of sensitive data containing information about individuals racial or 
ethnic origins, religious beliefs, union memberships, political opinions, sexual 
preferences and the like can not be processed without permission. In some cases, 
it cannot be processed even with the individual ' s permission. 
• Each country must have one or more public authorities responsib le for monitoring 
and enforcing the Directive. 
As noted above, effective implementation ofthe Directive's provisions req uired 
recognition ofthe reality of cross-border data flows. Simitis ( 1996, p. v i.) argues that a 
regulation which " ignored international transfers could hardly be reconciled with the 
direct relationship repeatedly stressed with the Union's commitment to human 
rights ... The Community's duty to respect and guarantee human rights does not cease at 
the Union's borders.'' Concern about data being processed beyond the reach of European 
Authorities resulted in Atticles 25 and 26 ofthe Directive which contain provisions for 
controlling transfer to third countries. 
Article 25. I states that the transfer of personal data which "are undergoing 
processing or are intended for processing after the transfer' ' can only take place if the 
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"third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection." The issue of 
adequacy is to be assessed in "l ight of all ofthe circumstances surrounding the data 
transfer operation" (25.2) and ifthe Commission finds that a third country does not 
ensure an adequate level of protection, member states should take the necessary measure 
to prevent the data transfer (25.4) (The Council 1995). 
Article 26 contains a number of "derogations'' which allow data transfer to 
countries \Vhere protection has not been deemed adequate given certain conditions. 
These include, for example: unambiguous consent ofthe data subject; performance of a 
contract; impottant public interest grounds; and the need to protect the "vital interests" of 
the data s ubject. It was assumed that many "everyday" transfers would be covered by 
Article 26 provisions of consent and contract including making hotel reservations, inter-
bank transfers of funds, and booking travel (Smitis 1996). 
The derogations aside, as standards of data protection in the U.S. were unlikely to 
meet the EU's criteria for adequacy, the provisions of Article 25 represented a serious 
threat to trans-Atlantic data flows. However, Article 25 also contains a provision (25.5) 
which instructs the Commission to enter into negotiations with third countries when 
there has been a finding that data protection levels are not adequate "with a view to 
remedying the situation" (The Council 1995). That led directly to the Safe Harbor 
negotiations with the United Sates. 
The Safe Harbor Agreement 
Once it became clear that trans-Atlantic data flows would not be assured on the 
basis of Atticle 26 exemptions alone and that adequacy would be an issue, negotiations 
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began between the U.S. and the EU Commission (Long and Quek 200 I ) .9 While initial 
discussions were frustrated by a lack of common ground, when Washington realized that 
the Commission was not going to accept the existing American self-regulatory regime as 
adequate negotiations then began in earnest between David Aaron, the Undersecretary for 
Trade in the Department of Commerce, and John Mogg, the Director General for the 
Internal Market (farrell forthcoming). 
The objective was to "bridge the gap," to find solution which would ensure the 
"adequacy" of protection of European data consistent with American preferences for 
reliance on self-regulation and market mechanisms. A suggestion by Aaron that 
adequacy should be judged on an organization by organization basis proved critical 
(farrell forthcoming); firms could enter a "Safe Harbor" by agreeing to a privacy 
protection regime acceptable to the CU. "Each organization subscribing to the safe 
harbor principles would be presumed to be providing adequate privacy protections" 
(Aaron 1999 , p. 4 ). 
The Department of Commerce proposed a first set of Safe Harbor pri nci pies in 
November 1998 and after eighteen months of negotiation, the European Commission's 
final approval was attained in the spring of2000 with the understanding they would come 
into effect the following November I st (farrell 2002; Long and Quek 200 I; Shimanek 
200 I). (The European Parliament, which had the authority to advise but not to consent to 
the agreement, rejected the finding of adequacy due to a complex combination of 
substantive, procedural and political factors.) 
9 W riting in 1995 Simitis argued that "most transfer cases arc, in fact, covered by the long list of exceptions 
found in Article 26 .. . " (1996, p. v ii). Sec (Farrell 2002; Farrell forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of 
the Sate Harbor negotiations. 
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Safe Harbor includes the Principles, a set of fAQs (frequently Asked Questions) 
which explore the provisions in more detail, and enforcement mechanisms. Safe Harbor 
is neither a treaty nor an international agreement but rather two unilateral actions: the 
U.S. issued the principles and the Commission issued an Article accepting them (Aaron 
200 I, statement of Barbara Wellberry, Councilor to the Under Secretary). 10 
In keeping with the American tradition of privacy protection, Safe Harbor was a 
reactive response to the threat of an interruption of data transfers between the EU and 
U.S. 11 It is an attempt to harmonize the effects of data protection schemes, rather than to 
reach agreement on principles or methods. farrell (2002) describes Safe Hatcbor as an 
"interface" between the European system of formal regulation and the American s ystem 
of self-regulation which is qualitatively different from either. Enforcement of Safe 
Harbor reli es on potential prosecution for unfair or deceptive advertising or promises by 
the federal Trade Commission. 12 
It is fair to say that Safe Harbor has not been seen as an overwhelming success on 
either side ofthe Atlantic. As of October 23, 2002 only 254 companies had enrolled, few 
ofthem major multinationals.13 The relatively low number of firms which have signed 
10 The EU agreed to Safe Harbor with the understanding that the arrangement would be reviewed the 
following year. Tt is important to note that given that Sate Harbor represents a unilateral determination of 
adequacy from the EU's point of view rather than a treaty, that determination can revoked if it becomes 
apparent that the agreement is not working as intended (Farrell forthcoming). 
11 A complete description ofSate Harbor and its provisions can be found on the Department of 
Commerce's W cbsitc at http:i iwww.cxport.gov/sateharbor/sh_ ovcrvicw.html. 
1::> The FTC's legal authority comes from Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibits 
unfair or deceptive practices. Rcidcnbcrg (200la) argues that the Constitutional basis for FTC oversight 
here is questionable. At present, only companies which tall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Department of Transportation (air carriers and ticket agents) arc eligible tor Sate 
Harbor. Tims, m~or sectors of the economy, such as financial services and telecommunications, must rely 
on the Data Directive 's Article 26 provisions for exemptions from the requirement of adequate protection. 
13 The list of organizations enrolled in Safe Harbor can be accessed from www.cxport.gov/sateharbor/ 
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up reflects concern about Safe Harbor combined with a sense that, at least at th is point, 
the penalties for non-compliance are not very obvious. 
In general, American firms believe that Safe Harbor goes too far, that 
implementing it will be too cDstly, that it might stimulate pressure for simi lar legislation 
in the U.S. and that it might subject them to unforeseen liabilities in Europe (Gruemvald 
2000). Concern about the impact of Safe Harbor on the American data privacy regime 
shadowed the entire process of negotiations: in a talk given to an industry group 
Ambassador Aaron took pains to make it clear that " ... these safe harbor principles have 
been developed and are aimed at a specific situation - reassuring the Europeans that their 
privacy ... will be protected ... ln no way does the U.S. government intend for these safe 
hat'bor principles to be seen as precedents for any future changes in the U.S. privacy 
regime" (Aaron 1999, p4-5 ). 
In contrast, American privacy advocates believe that Safe Harbor does not go 
nearl y far enough, that it is a weak and ineffective substitute for legislation. Reidenberg 
(200 I a, pp. 7 19 and 739), for example, argues that Safe Harbor is a "weak, seriously 
flawed solution fore-commerce'' and that Safe Harbor is no more than a mechan ism to 
"delay facing tough decis ion about international privacy." 
Safe Harbor was controvers ial in Europe from the statt with serious questions 
raised b y both national data authorities and in the European Parliament about the 
adequacy of data protection. The European Commission Staff Working Paper on the 
effectiveness of Safe Harbor issued in early 2002 (summarizing a 200 I review) was 
diplomatic, but clearly ex pressed concern about both implementation and the adequacy of 
data protection. It notes that the number of organizations self-cetiifying under Safe 
17 
Harbor is "lower than expect ed," and that many ofthose do not really satisfy the 
requirements of the agreement. It found that a substantial number of organizations do not 
meet the requirement that they publish a compliant privacy policy and indicate publicly 
their adherence to Safe Harbor. Less than half ofthose organizations post privacy 
policies that reflect all seven Safe Harbor principles or inform individuals how they can 
proceed with complaints and a dispute resolution mechanism. It observes that no 
company has been prosecuted for making false statements (European Commission Staff 
2002). 
Territorial Jurisdiction and the Internet 
The European Data Directive emerged during the last moments before 
Cyberspace exploded, it envisions a \Vorld of mainframe computers and trans-border data 
flows (Swire and Litan 1998). It reflects a transitory state of affairs: data transferred 
electronically in a physical world where borders, geography and a sense of place 
dominate. Atticle 25 is phrased in terms ofthe "transfer" of personal data to third 
countries and assumes a temporal sequence: that the data will either be transferred after 
14 processing or processed after transfer. 
In this world oftrans-border data flows or data "exports'' (Schwartz and 
Reidenberg 1996. p. 399), the jurisdictional issues raised are relatively straight-forward; 
the Directive uses the criterion of "place ofestahlishment of the controller ' or, in other 
words, the country of origin principle" (Article 29 - Data Protection Working Patty 2002, 
14 The European Data Directive descends from the data protection principles established in the OECD 
Guidelines of 1980 and the Council of Europe's Convention of 1981. Its immediate s timulus was the 
Single Market Initiative of the late 1980s; the initial data protection proposal was made by the Commission 
in 1990, a second draft was released in late 1992, and agreement was reached with the Member States in 
December 1994 prior to its adoption in February 1995 by the Council of M inistcrs (Regan 1996; Swire and 
Litan 1998). 
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p. 6, emphasis original). lfthe data are collected within the EU and processed within the 
borders of a member state (or "exported" for processing), there is no question about the 
applicability ofthe Directive and Article 25 takes the form of a traditional "at the border" 
control. 
Transactions in the Internet' s world of networked computers are much more 
ambiguous. Article 4.1, which deals w ith the applicability of law, states that national 
provis ions adopted by each Member State to comply with the Directive shall apply to the 
processing of personal data where: (4.1 c) '<the controller is not established on 
Community territory and, for purposes of processing personal data makes use of 
equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of said Member State, unless 
such equipment is used only for purposes of transit. .. " (The Council 1995, emphasis 
added). 15 This clause has been interpreted broadly to mean that a website anyplace in the 
world accessed by a user whose computer is located within the EU can be seen as 
"making use of eq uipment" s ituated on territory of a member state (Reidenberg 200 I a; 
Swire and Litan 1998). 
A more recent attempt to apply Article 4.1 to the Internet argues that the " place of 
establishment' ' is neither the place where the technology suppotting a web site is located 
nor the place at which the web site is accessible, but rather the place where it pursues its 
activity (Atticle 29 - Data Protection Working Party 2002). The question then, is whether 
the web s ite (data controller) makes use of equipment situated in the EU in pursuing its 
activity. If it does, it appears that the " place" where it pursues its activity is deemed to be 
within the territory of a Member State and the Data Directive applies. 
15 Tn fact, Rcidcnbcrg and Schwartz note that the French text of the Directive uses the term moyen.,· or 
means rather than equipment wh ich might well imply a greater applicability of the Directive to interactions 
in Cyberspace (Rcidcnbcrg and Schwartz 1998). 
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Two "concrete examples" are provided. If a "cookie" is placed on the hard drive 
of a computer located within the EU and data are sent back to the originating web site, 
the user' s PC is viewed as equipment in the sense of Article 4 and the provisions ofthe 
Data Directive apply. The same argument applies if Java Script or banners are used to 
collect personal data. 
Thus, if a user in Dortmund logs onto a Website in Dallas and provides personally 
identifiable information in exchange for access to a magazine article, or ifthe website 
places cookies on the computer' s hard drive, the EU Data Directive would apply to the 
website in Texas. It is reasonable to argue that a Website which makes use of European 
equipment (or means) should be subject to its reach, "to insure that Europeans are not 
deprived ofthe protection to which they are entitled under this Directive" (Article 29 -
Data Protection Working Party 2002, p. I 0). That conclusion, however, is problematic 
in a world organized politically in terms ofterritorial sovereignty. 
There is a large and well developed legal literature dealing with questions of 
jurisdiction and the internet. 16 Much ofthe "early" argument revolved around the 
question of whether or not Cyberspace is horderles.~·; whether geographic jurisdiction can 
be mapped on a virtual network. In a well known atticle that set the parameters ofthe 
discussion for some time, Johnson and Post argued that Cyberspace breaks down the 
correspondence between physical boundaries and "law space," that "Cyberspace radically 
undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) phenomena and physical 
location" ( 1996, p. 1370). 
In response, Goldsmith ( 1998) and others dismissed "Cyberanarchy," arguing that 
all of the equipment connected to the Net and al l of the people who use it are located in a 
16 Sec (Geist 2001) for a review. 
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specific physical place and that skeptics underestimate the power of traditional legal tools 
to deal with multi-jurisdictional regulatory problems. They argue that the Net is not 
borderless, but subject to traditional political and legal jurisdiction. The fundamental 
question at hand, however, is not \vhether the Internet is ''borderless," but whether the 
meaning of borders, mutually exclusive jurisdiction, and territoriality as political 
constructs will erode as Cyberspace and electronic networks gain in importance. 
Borders are not, and never have been, impenetrable barriers to flows of people, 
goods, currency and information. However, it is reasonable to ask ifthey continue to be 
significant in an economic or political sense when anyone with a computer connected to 
the Internet can cross them at \Vill, and may not even know that they have done so, to 
exchange information in the form of atticles, music, movies, books or digital cash. When 
in the terms of Goolsbee' s metaphor, everyone lives in a v ittual border town where 
crossing most borders is as easy as crossing the street (Goolsbee 2000). 
In Cyberspace the term "crossing borders" may be no more than a metaphor and 
an inappropriate one at that. In an interesting paper Hunter (2002) argues that the 
construct of"Cyberspace as place' ' is a cognitive physical metaphor that leads to a view 
of Cyberspace as phys ical pro petty which is dysfunctional in terms of attempts to 
develop a legal or regulatory framework for the Internet. The idea of borders as a 
barrier, which is necessary ifthey are to have substantive meaning, implies that physical 
or material goods cross them in geographic space and can be prevented from doing so at 
the \vill ofthe sovereign. 
A message transmitted on the Internet between two individuals located in Munich 
and Muncie does not "cross" a border in any meaningful sense of the word; both sets of 
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computers and their users remain fixed in place. While governments may be able to force 
entities at various points in the network to block transmission or receipt of the message, 
they cannot intercept it at the border and turn it back. When the user in Munich logs into 
a Website in Muncie it is more reasonable to argue that the interaction is taking place in 
both " locations" simultaneously than to think of it in terms of a transmission "sent" 
across physical space. Cyberspace is characterized by a "non-vectorial simultaneity,'' the 
possibility that interactions or transactions can take place in multiple "places" at a single 
time (Kobrin 200 I). 
The concept of mutually exclusive jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty gives 
any state the right to apply its law and regulation within its borders and to its citizens 
abroad; attempts to apply law and regulation extraterritorially , to non-nationals who are 
outside ofthe state' s borders, violates system norms. That term has been used to describe 
application of the EU ' s Data Directive to third countries (George, Lynch, and Marsnik 
200 I); indeed a recent EU Commission Working Party Report concerned with the 
question ofthe international implications of the Data Directive, uses examples such as 
competition law and consumer protection to argue explicitly that extra-territorial 
application may be necessary to protect the rights and interests of EU citizens (Article 29 
-Data Protection Working Party 2002). 
It is clear that the privacy rights of European citizens on the internet cannot be 
protected ifthe Data Directive does nothave an extraterritorial reach. However, Article 
4. 1 c implies that the EU (and by implication every jurisdiction) has the right to apply its 
regulation to any Website, regardless ofvv'here it is located, that can be accessed from and 
have an effect on its territory. By extension, that implies that every website or "data 
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controller" is, at least potentially, subject to regulation emanating from every jurisdiction 
in the world, a situation that has been described as "hyper-regulation (Wrenn 2002). 17 
That possibility would turn the idea of extraterritoriality on its head and corrupt 
fundamentally geography and territoriality as the organizing principles ofthe modern 
interstate system. At some point quantity becomes quality; if"cross-border" transactions, 
regulatory spill-over and extraterritorial jurisdictional reach become the norm rather the 
exception, one would have to question the meaning of both internal sovereignty in terms 
ofthe state as the ultimate domestic authority within its borders and external sovereignty 
in terms ofthe fundamental concept of mutually exclusive geographic jurisdiction. 
If personal information can be transmitted instantaneously to multiple locations 
anyplace in the world, its location becomes ambiguous (Bennett 1997). If that is the case, 
regulations which attempt to protect the data privacy of Europeans, or anyone else for 
that matter, must also ignore "location" as a constraint ifthey are to be effective. 
Extraterritorial reach not only becomes the norm, the concept itself looses meaning as the 
distinction between domestic and international affairs blurs to the point \vhere it is no 
longer meaningful and territoriality becomes problematic as the organizing principle 
underlying the international political system. 
Data Privacy and Global Governance 
As discussed above, there are significant differences in belief systems between 
Europe and the U.S. These include the meaning of privacy, as a basic human right or an 
alienable commodity, the res ponsibility of society to protect individuals versus the 
responsibility of individuals to protect themselves, whether government regulation is a 
17 Glodsmith (1998) argues that given the uncnforccability of most extraterritorial judgments, this 
possibility is not an issue in practice. vv11ilc that may be true at present, the problem is still conceptually 
important and it is far from clear that the threat ofhypcr-rcgulation is merely ephemeral. 
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first choice or a last resort, reliance on and the proper scope ofthe market, and the 
relative impottance of economic efficiency versus other social goods. While there are 
certainly Europeans who share American views and Americans who would prefer 
European regulatory solutions to data protection, belief systems relevant to the data 
privacy issue map reasonably well on political geography. 
McGrew ( 1997, p. 5) argues that the bounded sovereign state provides a 
territorially delimited space in which "the struggles for democracy, the nutturing of social 
solidarities, and co nstitutional forms of government could develop within a framework of 
the rule of law." In fact, a geographically organized international system assumes not 
only that the territorial state is the primary container of politics, but that there is a 
geographic congruity between politics, economics and social relations, and that 
geographic space has meaning as a political-economic construct. 
In the case at hand, we are left with democratic political institutions and belief 
systems which remain contained within the national space, data privacy regulation and 
transnational political activity both gradually expanding "political space" beyond national 
borders, and the "space" occupied by the global world economy and networked data 
systems encompassing at least most of the major markets. This marked geographic 
incongruity is affecting our ability to govern effectively. 
On the one hand, given the level of "cross-border'' transfers data privacy cannot 
be protected though unilateral acts within the borders of a single territory. On the other, 
integration renders the cost of interrupting those "cross-border" flows so high as to 
markedly constrain the freedom of action of each government to mitigate s pil lovers. 18 
18 The trans-Atlantic economy is deeply integrated. Sales of American firms' subsidiaries in the EU total 
over $ 11 7 billion (1998) and those of European finn s in the U.S. almost $ 107 billion (1999). The vast 
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This asymmetry between the political space necessary for the effective 
implementation of the Data Directive- or any effective data privacy regime- and the 
actual scope of existing territorial jurisdictions is manifest in number of ways in the case 
at hand. The Data Privacy Directive has generated considerable transnational political 
activity on the part of interested groups. 19 The Directi ve resulted in what has been called 
a "firestorm" of criticism in the U.S. because of concerns that its requirements would 
prevent the extensive data transfers necessary for effective integrated multinational 
operations (Regan 1996). As a result, American business firms lobbied directly in 
Brussels, and worked in conjunction with their European counterpatts through 
organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce and the Trans-Atlantic 
Business Dialogue (farrell forthcoming). 
American privacy advocates, who saw the Safe Harbor discussions as a unique 
oppottunity to argue for stronger domest ic data protection laws (Long and Quek 200 I), 
also established formal linkages with interested European groups. The Trans Atlantic 
Consumer Dialogue (T ACD) is a forum comprised of 45 EU and 20 US consumer groups 
formed in 1998 (Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue 2002). While privacy advocates' 
attempts to influence the process have not yet resulted in legislation in the U.S., the 
T ACD process allowed consumer groups to work together to influence both officials and 
majority of those firms transfer financial , credit and marketing data and personnel records among 
subsidiaries and between subsidiaries and headquarters electronically: their viability depends on their 
electronic data networks. 
19 More complete descriptions of the involvement of business and consumer groups in the process can be 
found in (Farrell forthcoming; Regan 1996). 
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Members of the European Parliament in Europe and the legislative process in the U.S 
(farrell fotthcoming).:w 
In an interconnected world it is increasingly likely that the legitimate decisions 
made by states will affect people and areas outside of a state's sovereign domain, that 
there is " less and less congruence between the group of participants in a collective 
decision and the total of all of those affected by their decision'' (Habermas 200 I, p. 70). 
That being said, it is difficult to envision an effective solution to the data privacy problem 
resulting from either a) regulatory efforts in either jurisdiction orb) negotiations between 
the two jurisdictions qua jurisdictions. There are two major issues here: democratic 
legitimacy and the meaning of "political space." 
There is an incongruence between the space where the Data Directive represents 
the "self-expression" of a political constituency and the space where it takes effect: 
bet\veen the actual "political space" encompassed by the Data Directive and the political 
space where it reflects the "common interests" of a distinct constituency (Scharpf 2000). 
Scharpf decomposes legitimacy into two components. Input legitimacy implies that 
"collectively binding decisions' ' flow from the self-expression ofthe constituency in 
question; laws should be self-determined rather than imposed exogenously. Output 
legitimacy implies that collectively binding decisions serve the common interests of the 
constituency, including those who may oppose the specific decision in question. It 
20 Tn a letter to Ambassador Aaron during the negotiations the TACD argued that the Sate Harbor proposal 
"fails to provide adequate privacy protection for consumers in the United Sates and Europe" and that the 
lack of adequate protection in the U.S. leaves the country increasingly isolated in the world marketplace. 
Tn comments attached to the letter they argued strongly that "Rather than eroding the principles of the 
Directive, Sate Harbor should seck to reinforce data protection for all individuals" (Trans Atlantic 
Consumer Dialogue 1999). 
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assumes that "a strong collective identity and a pervasive sense of a common fate will 
override divergent preferences and interests. 
American business firms' have expressed objection to being "subject" to 
European law and there is concern among both b usinesses and the Administration about 
European law becoming the de facto standard for data privacy in the U.S. On the other 
hand, Europeans have expressed concern about the lack of adequate protection in the U.S. 
and the hollowness ofthe Safe Harbor regime. To the extent interdependence makes the 
cost of not dealing with American "data controllers" and U.S. Websites prohibitive, 
Europeans find themselves subject to a privacy regime that is not of their making and 
certainly does not reflect their common interests. I s uspect that it is fair to say that there 
is no sense of input legitimacy on either side and both the reluctance of American 
organizations to submit to Safe Hat'bor and of Data Reg ulators in ind ividual European 
co untries to accept its protection as adequate are indications of a lack of output 
legitimacy, an unwillingness to accept the decision as binding. 
The problems \Vith Safe Harbor exemplify the difficulty of negotiating when there 
is deep-seated disagreement on basic values and beliefs about both the nature ofthe 
problem and appropriate solutions. An acceptable middle ground between privacy as an 
inalienable right and privacy as an alienable commodity, or a belief in the responsibility 
of society to protect citizens or data subjects and a bel ief in the individual responsibi lity 
of consumers to protect themselves is far from self-evident. It is difficult to conceive of a 
negotiated solution to the data privacy problem that is both effective and perceived as 
legitimate. In the absence of a some sense of a political community which transcends the 
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boundaries of either jurisdict ion, it is likely that any solution optimal for the larger 
political space would be rejected as il legitimate by both polities. 
Political space is socially constructed. The geographic organization ofthe 
Westphalian system would not have been possible before the rediscovery of Ptolemaic 
geography, the ability to conceive of external space in material rather than mythical or 
cosmological terms, and the emergence of single point perspective (Harvey 1990; Ruggie 
1993 ). A digital networked world economy entails a transition from spatial to relational 
modes of organization and in that sense "space" can only be seen as a metaphor for one 
or more multidimensional netwot'ks. I would certainly agree with Anderson ( 1996, p. 
142) that "(T)he medieval-to-modern political transformation was associated with a 
transformation in how space and time were experienced, conceptualized and represented. 
With contemporary globalization we may now be experiencing a similarly radical 
modern-to-postmodern transformation, with similarly radical consequences for existing 
territoriality." 
Our modes ofthought are trapped in the modern state system which is geographic 
to its core, we can only express our concepts of political and economic authority in terms 
of borders and territorial j urisdiction. Transnational integration, however, is increasingly 
re lational rather than geographic; the new political space from which effective and 
legitimate governance must emerge takes the form of relational networks rather than 
territory, a "space of flows" versus a "space of spaces" (Castel Is 2000). 
The trans-Atlantic dispute over data privacy is unfolding in a non-territorial 
political space that both transcends the borders of European Union and the United Sates. 
The transnational reach of "domestic" legislation, the difficulty of reaching a negotiated 
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solution perceived as democratically legitimate and the emergence of significant 
transnational political activity all indicate the problematic nature of territorial jurisdiction 
in this issue area and argue for a multidimensional reconceptualization of political space, 
including identities and affiliates as well as territoriality (Rosenau 1997) and perhaps 
other constructs as well. 
The "space'' in which a solution to the data privacy dispute will be found is both 
larger than either party's territory and fundamentally non-geographic. It is a space of 
flows, of networks of multinational firms, internet users, electronic commerce websites, 
governments, and transnational civi l society groups such as the TACO. An effective and 
legitimate resolution ofthe problem requires that this enlarged non-territorial space be 
occupied. That we think of communities in network terms and then "conceptualize legal 
jurisdiction in terms of social interactions that are fluid processes, not motionless 
demarcations, frozen in time and space" (Berman 2002, pp. 8-9). 
It is difficult to imagine this larger political space emerging s pontaneously. A 
governance regime will require effective international institutions that could provide a 
venue for discourse, for the development of interactive professional networks, and for 
public communications about the nature ofthe problem and the requirements for an 
effective solution. An international institution that makes it clear that all affected by 
political decisions are not located in a single jurisdiction and provides the ability for 
groups affected by decision to communicate publicly (Zurn 2000). 
A very relevant example is provided by the OECD's effotts to find an 
international cooperative solution to the problems of taxation of electronic commerce 
transactions. The OECD brought together representati ves of member governments, the 
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private sector, civi l society and professional groups for extensive d iscussions that dealt 
with the problems oftaxing electronic transactions in the context of very different 
systems of taxation across regions. The discussions reinforced the need for a common 
solution, or at least harmonization of effects across regions, and helped establish a 
community of common interest in dealing with these issues. The discussion also helped 
insure that interested groups in various countries understood the parameters of the 
problem in the sense of a common solution necessarily departing from ex ante 
preferences. 
Can one can generalize from the trans-Atlantic dispute over the Data Directive? 
That depends on the extent to which other issues share its critical characteristics. first, 
cross-border spillover is inherent in that any effective attempt to protect data privacy will 
have to have an extraterritorial reach. Second, there are deep-seated differences in beliefs 
about both the phenomenon itself and appropriate remedies across jurisdictions. Last, 
concerns about data privacy are increasingly centered in Cyberspace which in itself raises 
difficult issues about the relevance of borders, geography and the meaning of political 
space. 
There are certainly a number of issues which are inherently international in the 
sense that their solution is beyond the capabilities of any single national government. 
Global warming, financial stability, human rights, the AIDS epidemic, and povetty 
alleviation all serve as examples. An effective remedy for any ofthese problems will 
have to have a multi-jurisdictional reach. Several ofthese issues are also characterized 
by significant cross-national differences in normative and positive beliefs: the question 
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of patent protection for anti-A! OS drugs and what constitutes a human rights violation (as 
well whether international intervention is appropriate) come immediately to mind. 
In one sense these iss ues are similar to data privacy in that effective solutions 
which are perceived as legitimate will require an expansion of political space, the 
emergence of a political community \vhich transcends national borders. While far from 
complete or universally accepted, there are international political communities made up 
of civ il society groups, international organizations, multinational firms, and at least some 
states \vhich have emerged to deal with human rights and the environment. 
To a very large extent, however, these iss ues play out in physical rather than 
Cyberspace. That is, in a context where physical borders are meaningful and flows 
across them can be controlled- at least in theory - by states (global warming may be an 
exception here). That may limit our ability to generalize from the data privacy dispute, 
but it is a matter of degree and not kind. To the extent that regulatory spillover becomes 
the norm rather than the exception, borders, territorial jurisdiction, and geography as the 
mode of organization of the political system will become problematic. The data privacy 
dispute is illustrative of issues which are global in scope while the social and political 
institutions which deal with them are still predominately local and national. Any 
meaningful solution w ill require both enlarging political space by building the rudiments 
of a transnational social community and establishing more effective international 
institutions. 
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